The Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) is a principal campaign committee of the Democratic Party tasked with fundraising for and conducting advocacy supporting the Democratic Party’s campaign efforts for the U.S. House of Representatives. Since 2022, DCCC has been chaired by U.S. Representative Suzan DelBene (D-WA), who was appointed after the electoral defeat of former chairperson and then-U.S. Rep. Sean Patrick Maloney (D-NY) in the 2022 general election. 1 2 3
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DCCC has been criticized by left-of-center activists for supporting establishment-aligned Democratic candidates and incumbents at the expense of the left wing of the Party, most notably resulting in the implementation of a vendor “blacklist” in 2019 for campaign vendors that challenged incumbents. The policy was revoked in 2021 under then-Rep. Maloney. 4 5
During the run-up to the 2024 elections, Democrats held five fewer U.S. House seats than Republicans (with four vacancies). To take a majority, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee began targeting numerous seats in New York and California that supported President Joe Biden in the 2020 election but were taken by Republican candidates in 2022. 6
In January 2024, DCCC announced it was launching POWER (Persuade. Organize. Welcome. Educate. Reach.) The People, an eight-figure campaign to increase voting turnout among racial minorities. 7
DCCC’s 2024 election strategy was based on three strategic programs: “Frontline,” “Red-to-Blue,” and “Districts in Play.” 8 9
“Frontline” candidates were Democratic U.S. Congressmen in danger of losing their seats. DCCC’s Frontline program supported at least 31 candidates across 20 states. 8 9
“Red-to-Blue” candidates were Democratic candidates running against vulnerable Republican incumbents or Republican-held open seats. Selected candidates were required to meet certain fundraising and organizational goals. DCCC’s Red-to-Blue program was supporting 27 candidates across 15 states in 2024, with targets including New York’s 3rd Congressional District vacated by former Rep. George Santos (R-NY) and Colorado’s 3rd Congressional District vacated by Rep. Lauren Boebert (R-NY). 8 9
“Districts in Play” candidates were other Democratic candidates supported by DCCC against Republican incumbents. DCCC’s Districts in Play program was supporting 27 candidates across 15 states in 2024. 8 9 As of August 2024, DCCC had raised $210,791,453 and spent $139,150,480 million in the 2024 election cycle. 10
DCCC’s largest vendor has been RWT Productions ($18,939,606) followed by Elias Law Group ($8,417,701), the law firm of Democratic activist attorney Marc Elias. Other large vendors include Paylocity ($8,263,093), Amplify Media ($4,398,324), Tatango Inc. ($3,121,368), Kelly and Associates Insurance Group ($2,507,011), ActBlue ($1,853,084), and Rising Tide Interactive ($1,818,500). 10
DCCC’s expenditure was most heavily concentrated in California ($30,846,291) followed by New York ($18,202,144), Massachusetts ($8,496,735), Texas ($5,727,701), and Illinois ($5,240,001). 10
DCCC’s largest donor was the U.S. Congressional campaign of Hakeem Jeffries (D-NY). Other employers reported by large DCCC donors include Bain Capital, the venture capital firm Kleiner Perkins, Alphabet (the parent company of Google and YouTube), Oaktree Capital Management, Massachusetts General Hospital, the Simon Youth Foundation, and Granite Telecommunications. 10
During the 2022 election cycle, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee raised $362,967,111 and spent $367,701,788. 10 In the 2022 elections, Democrats lost cost control of the U.S. House. Despite the loss, the DCCC’s efforts were considered strong given declining support for President Joe Biden and typical Congressional losses for incumbent parties during midterm elections. 11
During the 2020 election cycle, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee raised $345,784,504 and spent $330,435,309. 10 Democrats lost 11 seats, resulting in the Democrats retaining a narrow majority, despite the victory of President Joe Biden over then-President Donald Trump. New York magazine’s Intelligencer characterized the outcome as “To say that House races didn’t turn out as expected would be a major understatement,” noting that analysts from Sabato’s Crystal Ball and the Cook Political Report had predicted likely Democratic seat gains. 12 13
U.S. Representative Suzan DelBene (D-WA) was appointed chair of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee on December 20, 2022 by incoming U.S. House Democratic leader Hakeem Jeffries (D-NY). U.S. Rep. DelBene was first elected to Congress in 2012 after serving as the director of the Washington State Department of Revenue and in numerous corporate executive positions at Microsoft, Nimble Technology, and Drugstore.com. During the 2018 election cycle, she served as finance co-chair of DCCC and in 2020 as co-chair of DCCC’s Frontline program. 14 U.S. Reps. Ami Bera (D-CA) and Tony Cardenas (D-CA) were also considered for the role, but Rep. DelBene was chosen because, according to CNN’s sources, “they needed to elevate a woman to the role.” She was the first DCCC chairperson to be appointed to the role rather than elected by the members of the House Democratic Caucus after a rule change in 2021. 3
In June 2023, Rep DelBene was criticized for allegedly violating the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act of 2012; under the Act, U.S. representatives are required to publicly disclose sales of securities worth more than $1,000 no later than 45 days after execution. Rep. DelBene allegedly had waited 288 and 105 days after two sales of Microsoft stock worth a total of $6.75 million. Both Rep. DelBene and her husband had previously worked for Microsoft. 15
In January 2023, Julie Merz became the executive director of DCCC. Merz previously served as a staffer for U.S. Rep. Steny Hoyer (D-MD) and the head of his PAC, AMERIPAC. 16
Tasha Cole has been the deputy executive director and chief diversity officer of DCCC since 2019. In 2023, she was also appointed deputy executive director for stakeholder engagement. Cole is the co-chair of Running Start, a female leadership training nonprofit. From 2012 to 2019, Cole was the vice president of resource development at the Congressional Black Caucus Foundation. Earlier, Cole served as a staffer for U.S. Reps. Frederica Wilson (D-FL) and Kendrick Meek (D-FL) and worked for the Democratic National Committee and Florida Democratic Party. 17 18 19
In 2019, Cole interviewed for a diversity-promoting position at DCCC, and at her request, the position of chief diversity officer was created for her. 20
Former U.S. Rep. Sean Patrick Maloney (D-NY) was the chairperson of DCCC from 2021 to 2023. He served in his U.S. Congressional seat from 2013 to 2023 and previously worked as an advisor to President Bill Clinton. Rep. Maloney left his post at DCCC after an unexpected defeat in his 2022 U.S. Congressional election that has been described as “humiliating” and a “face plant.” Despite occupying a Democratic-leaning district, Rep. Maloney was defeated by Republican Mike Lawler (R-NY). Most notably, Rep. Maloney spent weeks before Election Day in Europe raising $1 million for DCCC rather than campaigning in his home district. Rep. Maloney was the first DCCC chair to lose reelection since 1980. 1 2
U.S. Rep. Cheri Bustos (D-IL) served as DCCC chair from 2019 to 2021. Her tenure was marred by controversies from the outset, largely revolving around her support for establishment candidates against the left wing of the Democratic Party, which has been characterized as a “war with progressive House Democrats.” Shortly after taking office, Rep. Bustos implemented a policy blacklisting vendors that supported Democratic primary challengers to incumbent Democrats. Then, she hosted a fundraiser for incumbent then-Rep. Dan Lipinski (D-IL), a Democrat who opposed abortion and voted against the Affordable Care Act, to oppose a left wing Democratic primary challenger. Next, Rep. Bustos became embroiled in a revolt by racial minority representatives who criticized her for not appointing any racial minorities to executive positions at DCCC. Finally, DCCC failed to meet expectations from analysts such as Sabato’s Crystal Ball that predicted Democratic seat gains in the 2020 elections.21 12 13
During the 2022 election cycle, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee intervened in Republican Party primaries to target Republican candidates who opposed former President Donald Trump’s unproven claims of widespread fraud in the 2020 presidential election or had voted to impeach him. In Michigan’s 3rd Congressional District, DCCC supported John Gibbs (R-MI) in the Republican primary against then-U.S. Rep. Peter Meijer (R-MI), who had supported impeaching President Trump after the January 6 riot at the U.S. Capitol. 22
In February 2021, then-DCCC chairperson Rep. Sean Patrick Maloney (D-NY) stated that associating the Democratic Party with socialism or the policy of defunding the police was a “Republican caricature” of the Party and claimed it did not represent its true interests. The remark was seen as an attempt by establishment members of the Democratic Party to marginalize the Party’s left wing, including Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY). 23
During the 2020 election cycle, Iowa candidate J.D. Scholten publicly rejected funding from DCCC. According to Scholten, DCCC initially prioritized his race for the state’s 4th Congressional District and promised ample funding, but then lowered its funding due to Scholten’s failure to reach certain benchmarks, so Scholten rejected funding to have more control over his campaign. Scholten was eventually defeated by U.S. Rep. Randy Feenstra (R-IA). 24
In April 2019, DCCC implemented a policy of blacklisting any campaign vendors that supported primary challengers to Democratic U.S. Congressional incumbents. DCCC asserted that the policy was designed to unify the party and protect its majority in the U.S. House. Left-wing elements within the Democratic Party, including U.S. Reps. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY) and Ayanna Pressley (D-MA) and the entire Congressional Progressive Caucus, argued that the blacklisting policy stifled their faction within the party. Some critics saw the policy as a response to Rep. Ocasio-Cortez’s unexpected victory over former Rep. Joe Crowley (D-NY), an establishment incumbent who was expected to climb the Party’s ranks. 4 5
In response to the blacklist, 40 Democratic student organizations at universities across the United States launched a boycott of financial support for DCCC. 25 Rep. Ocasio-Cortez also asked Democrats to pause donations to DCCC. 26
In March 2021, DCCC ended the blacklist policy after the election of then-U.S. Rep. Sean Patrick Maloney to DCCC chairman, who campaigned on ending the policy. 5
In 2019, then-DCCC chair Rep. Cheri Bustos (D-IL) was criticized for a lack of diversity among her high-level appointees within the organization prompting Allison Jaslow, a “long-time Bustos ally,” to resign from her position as DCCC executive director along with five other staffers. Rep. Bustos issued a statement and pointed out that her husband is Mexican, her children are half-Mexican, and her son is marrying a Black woman. Rep. Bustos then appointed Jacqueline Newman, a Cuban American, as interim executive director. DCCC staff members were also directed to undergo “diversity and inclusion” training. 27 21
During the 2018 election cycle, DCCC was criticized for financing campaign operations against left-wing Democratic U.S. Congressional candidates in Democratic primaries to support establishment candidates. In Texas’s 7th Congressional District, DCCC released opposition research against Texas Democratic candidate Laura Moser with a series of attacks, including the allegation that she “begrudgingly” moved from Washington, D.C. to Houston just to run for office. DCCC’s attack created so much controversy that Moser jumped in the polls to second place, though she still lost the Democratic primary to U.S. Rep. Lizzie Pannill Fletcher (D-TX). Soon after, in Pennsylvania’s 7th Congressional District, DCCC asked Pennsylvania Democratic primary candidate Greg Edwards to drop out of the race. He refused and finished third in the primary election that was won by U.S. Rep. Susan Wild (D-PA). 28
In 2016, DCCC was hacked by an individual identifying him or herself as “Guccifer 2.0.” The individual released the private phone numbers and emails of numerous Democratic U.S. Congressional candidates on a WordPress blog. American intelligence agencies claimed that the Russian government was the most likely culprit. 29
Since at least 2016, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee has made efforts to increase the diversity of its staff and campaign managers throughout the United States. However, critics have contended that DCCC has repeatedly fallen behind its diversity goals. In 2019, 38 percent of DCCC’s staff was a racial minority; by 2021, the figure had risen to 54 percent. 30
DCCC requires all potential vendors to submit a form that “provides a snapshot of [the] firm’s diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) efforts and statistics.” 31
During the 2020 and 2022 election cycles, DCCC spent $30 million on “minority owned and led” vendor firms, compared to $700,000 in 2014. 17
In 2019, DCCC reformed its vendor form to “prioritize businesses with nonwhite, women, or LGBTQ owners.” 4
In May 2022, 200 employees at the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee formed a union under the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT). DCCC immediately recognized the union, which was the largest within a Democratic Party organization at the time of its formation. 32 33