Non-profit

Verified Voting Foundation

Website:

verifiedvoting.org/

Location:

Philadelphia, PA

Tax ID:

20-0765743

Tax-Exempt Status:

501(c)(3)

Budget (2019):

Revenue: $1,191,797
Expenses: $1,290,110
Assets: $172,194

Formation:

2004

Type:

Voting Integrity Advocacy Group

Co-Directors:

Mark Lindeman and Cris Landa

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The Verified Voting Foundation is an electoral integrity advocacy group and the partner organization of the left-of-center advocacy organization Verified Voting. The Foundation is heavily involved in promoting the use of verified paper ballots, risk-limiting audits, and other election measures around the country and frequently provides advice and consulting to election authorities.

Founding and History

Computer scientist David Dill formed the Verified Voting Foundation in opposition to the widespread adoption of touchscreen voting machines in the wake of the 2000 election. 1 Since then, the organization has continued to advocate for what it considers to be election integrity best practices, including the use of verified paper ballots, and has advised decision makers around the country on their voting procedures and equipment. 2

Finances

In 2019, the Verified Voting Foundation reported $1,191,797 in revenue, of which $1,152,055 was derived from contributions and grants. The Foundation also reported $1,290,110 in expenses, of which $440,148 was allocated to salary and benefits. The Verified Voting Foundation ended the fiscal year with $126,221 in net assets. 3

Advocacy

The Verified Voting Foundation opposes the use of electronic voting machines, claiming that they are more vulnerable to election fraud. Verified Voting Foundation maintains that some form of hand-marked paper ballot is the most secure form of voting and is opposed to what it considers insecure electronic voting systems. 4

The Foundation has also controversially recommended the use of risk-limiting audits (RLAs) to provide statistical evidence that the electronic tabulation of ballots is consistent with what a hand count of ballots would indicate. The Foundation has argued that such a system can reduce the resources needed to verify elections and can avoid the necessity of a full hand recount. 5 6

The Foundation strongly supports the use of paper ballots in all elections in order to provide a paper trail that can be consulted when verifying that electronic voting systems were not compromised. The Foundation has also argued for a strong chain of ballot custody, including the use of post-election audits to verify results. 7

The Foundation is opposed to voting by internet, claiming that doing so would compromise the secrecy and integrity of a ballot. The Foundation has also argued that internet voting systems would be vulnerable to attack and allow for votes to be tracked back to specific individuals, in addition to being susceptible to voter fraud. 8

To promote its policy goals, the Verified Voting Foundation works with jurisdictions to promote a transition to paper ballots and provides technological and security experts to advise election authorities on what it considers to be best practices. 9

Online Tools

Aside from its policy work, the Verified Voting Foundation maintains several electoral tools. The Verified Voting Foundation operates an online database of voting equipment used in every jurisdiction in the U.S. called the “Verifier.” The Foundation has claimed that the database and visualization system has been used by government officials, researchers, and journalists, including election decision makers. 10 11

The Verified Voting Foundation also maintains a database of every piece of voting equipment used in the U.S. and provides instructions on how the equipment is used, its manufacturer, and where each system is currently in use. 12 13

The Foundation also runs the Audit Law Database, which lists the audit laws and regulations for all jurisdictions in the country, and the Vote Visualizer, a data visualization program that uses algorithms to identify statistical outliers in elections. 14 15

Risk Limiting Audits Controversy

In the fall of 2019, two Verified Voting Foundation board members resigned in protest over what they considered to be flaws in the organization’s approach to risk-limiting audits. The members claimed that the Foundation was not properly emphasizing the need to establish trustworthy paper trails that would be audited, instead portraying risk-limiting audits as a catch-all solution to election security. 16

One of the former board members, University of California, Berkeley professor of statistics Phillip Stark, also stated that voting machine manufacturers were promoting machines that print ballot summary cards that were vulnerable and potentially inaccurate. Stark claimed that the Foundation was assisting jurisdictions acquire these types of machines, even though every technical expert on the board advised against doing so. 17

Leadership

David Dill is the founder and current board member of the Verified Voting Foundation. He is strong advocate of maintaining a paper ballot system and an outspoken opponent of internet voting. 18

Barbara Simons is the chair of the board of the Verified Voting Foundation. Simons has many ties to the Democratic Party, and in 2016, Simons tried to persuade the Clinton campaign to demand a review of the election results. 19 Simons is also on the board of the left-of-center Democracy Alliance, an influential group of Democratic donors. 20

References

  1. Ian Chipman. “David Dill: Why Online Voting Is a Danger to Democracy.” Stanford School of Engineering, June 9, 2016. Accessed April 21, 2021. https://engineering.stanford.edu/magazine/article/david-dill-why-online-voting-danger-democracy.
  2. Ian Chipman. “David Dill: Why Online Voting Is a Danger to Democracy.” Stanford School of Engineering, June 9, 2016. Accessed April 21, 2021. https://engineering.stanford.edu/magazine/article/david-dill-why-online-voting-danger-democracy.
  3. Verified Voting Foundation, IRS (Form 990), 2018
  4. Verified Voting. “Voting Equipment.” Accessed April 26, 2021. https://verifiedvoting.org/votingequipment/.
  5. Verified Voting. “What Is a Risk-Limiting Audit?” Accessed April 26, 2021. https://verifiedvoting.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/VV-What-Is-RLA-V4-Flowchart-2021.pdf.
  6. Verified Voting. “Audits.” Accessed April 26, 2021. https://verifiedvoting.org/audits/.
  7. Verified Voting. “Paper Records.” Accessed April 26, 2021. https://verifiedvoting.org/paperrecords/.
  8. Verified Voting. “Internet Voting.” Accessed April 26, 2021. https://verifiedvoting.org/internetvoting/.
  9. Verified Voting. “Election Security.” Accessed April 26, 2021. https://verifiedvoting.org/electionsecurity/.
  10. Verified Voting. “Tools.” Accessed April 26, 2021. https://verifiedvoting.org/tools/.
  11. Verified Voting. “Verifier.” Accessed April 26, 2021. https://verifiedvoting.org/verifier/.
  12. Verified Voting. “Voting Equipment Database – Clear Ballot ClearCast.” Accessed April 26, 2021. https://verifiedvoting.org/election-system/clear-ballot-clearcast/.
  13. Verified Voting. “Tools.” Accessed April 26, 2021. https://verifiedvoting.org/tools/.
  14. Verified Voting. “Audit Law Database.” Accessed April 26, 2021. https://verifiedvoting.org/auditlaws/.
  15. Verified Voting. “Vote Visualizer.” Accessed April 26, 2021. https://verifiedvoting.org/votevisualizer/.
  16. Guy, Sandra. “Update on Efforts to Ensure Accurate, Verifiable Elections.” All Together. Society of Women Engineers, January 30, 2020. Accessed April 26, 2021. https://alltogether.swe.org/2020/01/update-on-efforts-to-ensure-accurate-verifiable-elections/.
  17. Guy, Sandra. “Update on Efforts to Ensure Accurate, Verifiable Elections.” All Together. Society of Women Engineers, January 30, 2020. Accessed April 26, 2021. https://alltogether.swe.org/2020/01/update-on-efforts-to-ensure-accurate-verifiable-elections/.
  18. Ian Chipman. “David Dill: Why Online Voting Is a Danger to Democracy.” Stanford School of Engineering, June 9, 2016. Accessed April 21, 2021. https://engineering.stanford.edu/magazine/article/david-dill-why-online-voting-danger-democracy.
  19. Friess, Steve. “Inside the Recount.” The New Republic, February 15, 2017. Accessed April 26, 2021. https://newrepublic.com/article/140254/inside-story-trump-clinton-stein-presidential-election-recount.
  20. “Barbara Simons.” Democracy Alliance, July 31, 2018. Accessed April 26, 2021. https://democracyalliance.org/people/barbara-simons/.
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Nonprofit Information

  • Accounting Period: June - May
  • Tax Exemption Received: May 1, 2005

  • Available Filings

    Period Form Type Total revenue Total functional expenses Total assets (EOY) Total liabilities (EOY) Unrelated business income? Total contributions Program service revenue Investment income Comp. of current officers, directors, etc. Form 990
    2019 Jun Form 990 $1,191,797 $1,290,110 $172,194 $45,973 N $1,152,055 $38,304 $114 $141,510 PDF
    2018 Jun Form 990 $1,306,342 $1,264,320 $336,536 $117,786 N $1,301,646 $0 $5,147 $200,726 PDF
    2017 Jun Form 990 $438,221 $755,635 $246,004 $69,276 N $437,770 $0 $0 $205,615
    2016 Jun Form 990 $732,319 $587,450 $465,815 $6,044 N $731,300 $0 $0 $128,750
    2015 Jun Form 990 $646,256 $543,221 $382,558 $600 N $645,076 $0 $0 $82,125 PDF
    2014 Jun Form 990 $786,741 $738,525 $336,547 $57,624 N $786,692 $0 $49 $73,000 PDF
    2013 Jun Form 990 $529,218 $633,920 $173,259 $11,697 N $529,119 $0 $99 $46,016 PDF
    2012 Jun Form 990 $564,766 $406,987 $271,786 $5,522 N $564,659 $0 $107 $38,500 PDF
    2011 Jun Form 990 $418,861 $541,749 $117,297 $8,812 N $389,889 $27,947 $1,025 $70,000 PDF

    Additional Filings (PDFs)

    Verified Voting Foundation

    1735 MARKET STREET NO A435
    Philadelphia, PA 19103-7501